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Essay
STATISTICS, NOT EXPERTS
WILLIAM MEADOW†
CASS R. SUNSTEIN††
INTRODUCTION
Legal proceedings, both judicial and administrative, frequently
raise questions about what people, including experts, ordinarily do.
1 If
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1. There is a dispute about the weight to be given to ordinary practice. Generally in negli-
gence actions, custom is considered informative but not definitive. RICHARD  A. EPSTEIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 201–42 (7th ed. 2000); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 193, 195 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]:
[E]vidence of the usual and customary conduct of others under similar circumstances
is normally relevant and admissible, as an indication of what the community regards
as proper . . . . [A]s a general rule, the fact that a thing is done in an unusual manner is
merely evidence to be considered in determining negligence, and is not in itself con-
clusive.
For the classic case, see The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding that confor-
mity to custom does not preclude a finding of negligence). See also Trimarco v. Klein, 436
N.E.2d 502, 506 (N.Y. 1982) (refusing to give custom in shower door installation conclusive
weight).
In many jurisdictions, however, medical malpractice is an exception to the rule, and
custom defines reasonable conduct. EPSTEIN, supra, at 225 (identifying the role of custom in
medical malpractice cases as “conclusive on the standard of medical care”); PROSSER AND
KEETON, supra, at 189 (“[T]he standard of conduct becomes one of ‘good medical practice,’
which is to say, what is customary and usual in the profession.”); see, e.g., Burgess v. Superior
Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1206 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the legal standard of care required for doc-
tors is the standard of practice required by their own profession); Cross v. Huttenlocher, 440
A.2d 952, 954 (Conn. 1981) (“A physician is under a duty to his patient to exercise that degree
of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general line of practice ordinarily pos-SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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a doctor is accused of negligence, for example, it is necessary to know
about the customary practice of doctors.
2 Of course, negligence judg-
ments depend, at least in part, on an assessment of ordinary practice.
3
But how is ordinary practice by professionals or others to be as-
sessed?
In trials and on appeal, the basic answer is that the assessment
comes via statements from expert witnesses who describe the ordi-
nary practice.
4 There can be no doubt that experts know a great deal
about topics on which ordinary people lack information. But experts,
no less than other people, are subject to predictable biases.
5 Their
judgments about risk are affected by the same heuristics and biases to
sess and exercise in similar cases.”); Spensieri v. Lasky, 723 N.E.2d 544, 548 (N.Y. 1999) (stating
that a physician will usually be insulated from tort liability where there is evidence that he or
she conformed to accepted community standards of practice); Toth v. Cmty. Hosp., 239 N.E.2d
368, 372 (N.Y. 1968) (“The law generally permits the medical profession to establish its own
standard of care.”); MacPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 896 (N.C. 1982) (holding that failure to
adhere to customary practices of informed consent results in civil liability); Boone v. Fisher, No.
13-96-001-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4244, at *4 (Tex. App. June 22, 2000) (stating that a trier
of fact, when determining whether a doctor’s actions were reasonable, must be advised of stan-
dard medical practice). But cf. McNeill v. United States, 519 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.S.C. 1981)
(cautioning that customary medical treatment is not conclusive on the exercise of care); Vassos
v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 768, 772 (Wyo. 1981) (“[T]he skill, diligence, knowledge, means and
methods are not those ‘ordinarily’ or ‘generally’ or ‘customarily’ exercised or applied, but are
those that are ‘reasonably’ exercised or applied.”).
2. See supra note 1.
3. We build on existing law here, without intending to enter into debates about the extent
to which law should simply incorporate, or improve upon, the existing standard of care. See su-
pra note 1; see also, e.g., Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1027 (Ill. 1996)
(suggesting that existing custom is not determinative); Roach v. Springfield Clinic, No. 73,394,
1992 Ill. LEXIS 204, at *33–*36 (Ill. Dec. 4, 1992) (same); Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l
Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965) (same). On any view, the customary practice is relevant,
and that is sufficient for our purposes here.
4. See supra note 1.
5.S e e  Hillel Einhorn, Expert Judgment: Some Necessary Conditions and an Example, in
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 324, 325 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (discuss-
ing the decisional factors and biases of expert judgment); David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert
Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra, at 336,
341–44 (discussing factors that limit clinical judgments); Gary Gaeth & James Shanteau, Re-
ducing the Influence of Irrelevant Information on Experienced Decision Makers, in JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING, supra, at 305, 306–16 (outlining empirical evidence of experts’ use of
irrelevant information in decisionmaking); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Un-
der Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 3, 18 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting the intuitive bias of statistical ex-
perts).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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which most people are subject, even if (and this is a disputed ques-
tion) expertise tends to reduce the most serious errors.
6
To correct the resulting problems, we offer a simple proposal:
The legal system should rely, whenever it can and far more than it
now does, on statistical data about doctors’ performance rather than
on the opinions of experts about doctors’ performance. For the first
time, it is becoming possible for law to rely on this evidence, for the
simple reason that it is becoming increasingly available. If our argu-
ment is convincing in the medical context, it should apply in many
other settings in which experts are asked to testify about negligence
or deviations from ordinary practices. In many settings, the fallible
opinions of isolated experts should be supplemented or replaced by
statistical data. Those opinions should be seen as a kind of crude sec-
ond-best, far inferior to the data that it approximates. A step toward
reliance on such data would dramatically increase the sense and ra-
tionality of tort law, and perhaps other areas of law as well.
We are hopeful that the use of statistical data will simplify some
of the central issues in litigation and reduce the role of strategic be-
havior in the litigation process. Battles between isolated experts will
be easier to mediate when there is a large pool of evidence on which
to draw. But our larger claim is that by using statistical data, the legal
system will reach far more accurate results. If the law is seeking to de-
termine the standard of care, it should not depend on fallible memo-
ries and recollections of local experiences. It should draw instead on
more global evidence of the kind that is increasingly available for use
in court and elsewhere.
7
6.S e e  Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 781–811
(2001) (discussing errors in risk-related judgments by judges).
7. It should be clear that this Essay is intended as a contribution to the rapidly growing
work in what is sometimes called behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (proposing that
law and economics analysis can be improved by increased attention to patterns of actual human
behavior). Our proposal also is in line with recent work on the general value of using social sci-
ence in law. For a valuable discussion of the increased use of social science evidence in law, see
generally Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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I.  EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM ABOUT RISKS
A. In General
It is now well known that most normal people tend to be “risk
optimists,” in the particular sense that they believe themselves to be
relatively insulated from risks that are faced by others who are simi-
larly situated.
8 This is one of the most robust findings in cognitive psy-
chology. For example, ninety percent of drivers believe that they are
safer than most drivers and less likely to be involved in a serious acci-
dent.
9 Most people believe that they are distinctly unlikely to be sub-
ject to various risks, such as cancer, heart disease, and divorce.
10 In
some important domains, people appear not only to believe them-
selves less likely than others to fall prey to certain risks, but also to
underestimate the actual risk to which they are subject.
11 With respect
to automobile accidents, people believe that the danger they face is
less than it is as a matter of statistical fact.
12 Smokers appear to know
8. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules,  in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 288, 290–92 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing ex-
cessive optimism); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807–12 (1980) (discussing individuals’ tendency to believe
themselves to be less vulnerable than other people to adverse events).
W. Kip Viscusi, in his article Using Warnings to Extend the Boundaries of Consumer
Sovereignty, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 211 (2000), offers an intriguing qualification, sug-
gesting that although people might believe that they are less subject to certain risks than most
other people, they also might have a statistically accurate understanding of the risks to which
they are subject. Id. at 227. In other words, they might believe that they are less likely to have a
car accident than most people, but also have an accurate sense of the lifetime risk that they will
die in a car crash (say, 1 in 1000). Id. Viscusi offers evidence to support this hypothesis. Id. at
216–17 (describing evidence of accurate risk assessments of workers). But see John Ayanian &
Paul Cleary, Perceived Risks of Heart Disease and Cancer Among Cigarette Smokers, 281 JAMA
1019, 1020–21 (1999) (suggesting an underestimate of the actual risk for smokers); Jolls, supra,
at 291 (same in the context of car accidents). In any event, resolving this debate is not necessary
for our purposes. The very possibility of expert error and overoptimism, confirmed by the stud-
ies described in this Essay, is enough to justify reliance on statistics rather than on isolated ex-
perts.
9. SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS 10–11 (1989).
10. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 810.
11.S e e  Jolls, supra note 8, at 291 (“[P]eople [underestimate] their own probability as op-
posed to overestimating the average person’s probability.”).
12.S e e  Richard Arnould & Henry Grabowski, Auto Safety Regulation: An Analysis of
Market Failure, 12 BELL J. ECON. 27, 34–35 (1981) (discussing excessive optimism about the risk
of automobile accidents); Colin Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL’Y  ANALYSIS  & MGMT. 565, 566–67 (1989)
(same).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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the statistical risks of smoking,
13 but they believe that they are less
likely than most smokers to fall victim to the various risks.
14 In one
study, less than half of smokers surveyed believed that they had a
higher-than-average risk of cancer or cardiovascular disease; indeed,
most heavy smokers (at least forty cigarettes per day) believed that
they were not at any increased risk.
15 Only one group of people does
not show a tendency to excessive optimism: the clinically depressed.
16
It would be natural to infer that unrealistic optimism, in many
cases, is adaptive. Though such optimism may cause false predictions
of outcomes, an optimistic attitude may increase the probability of a
good outcome and otherwise create hedonic benefits.
17 This may be
particularly true in the medical context; perhaps an excessively opti-
mistic doctor is more likely to get good results. If so, optimism is well
adapted to the social role of a doctor. It also might be thought that
some social settings work against optimistic bias. In markets, for ex-
ample, entrepreneurs might have an incentive toward realism, espe-
cially because market pressures—it might be expected—would punish
and drive out those who are unrealistically optimistic. But even if
markets move people toward realism, entrepreneurs, no less than
anyone else, have been shown to suffer from unrealistic optimism.
18 It
is noteworthy that expert witnesses are not disciplined by ordinary
market pressures.
19 If experts err, they might even help their clients,
13.S e e  W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING 4 (1992) (showing substantial awareness among indi-
viduals of the statistical risks of smoking).
14. Ayanian & Cleary, supra note 8, at 1020–21.
15.I d .
16. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 212–15, 226 (noting the lack of excessive optimism among
depressed people); Peter Lewinsohn et al., Social Competence and Depression, 89 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 203, 207–08, 210–11 (1980) (same).
17. This is the thesis of TAYLOR, supra note 9. For a discussion of optimism and self-
fulfilling prophecies, see NICHOLAS  CHRISTAKIS, DEATH  FORETOLD: PROPHECY AND
PROGNOSIS IN MEDICAL CARE 135–62 (1999) (evaluating the role of self-fulfilling prophecies in
medicine). There are analogies in the domain of athletics. Consider the comments of basketball
coach Lenny Wilkins: “The shooter should think the shot’s going in. Everyone else should be
thinking he’s going to miss.” Phil Jasner, Sixers Find the Road Better Than Home, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 30, 2000, LEXIS, Phila. Daily News File.
18.S e e  K ENNETH  R. MACCRIMMON  & DONALD  A. WEHRUNG, TAKING  RISKS 7, 260
(1986) (discussing the optimism of entrepreneurs); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid
Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 27–28
(1993) (same).
19. In this respect, experts are like juries, which also lack ordinary market discipline. Of
course there is something of a market for expert witnesses, so that people will lack credibility,
and opportunities to be witnesses, if they are systematically (shown to be) wrong. But it would
be heroic to suggest that these pressures ensure accuracy from experts.SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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and hence excessive optimism might well be favored, rather than dis-
favored, by whatever market pressures exist in this domain.
B. Optimism and Pessimism in Clinical Practice
It seems reasonable to speculate that those with specialized
knowledge are far less prone to optimistic bias and to other motiva-
tional and cognitive errors. Unfortunately, this appears not to be the
case. It has been found almost universally that physicians, no less than
other people, are prone to make cognitive mistakes and indeed have a
substantial tendency to err in predicting outcomes.
20 “Virtually all” of
the existing studies of physicians “have documented frequent and
large errors in predictions.”
21 No study finds a high level of accuracy.
The errors tend in a particular direction: “physicians are prone to an
optimistic bias.”
22
As an example, consider a study published in 1972 that showed
that in making predictions about the length of survival for cancer pa-
tients, only 47% of the physicians provided prognoses that were even
roughly accurate and that 80–90% of the mistakes were excessively
optimistic.
23 A subsequent study published in 1987 found overesti-
mates of survival time in 88% of the cases, by roughly a factor of
three.
24 A recent, large-scale study found inaccurate predictions in
80% of cases, with 63% of these showing overestimates.
25 Interest-
ingly, patient characteristics (age, race, sex, illness duration) were not
correlated with inaccurate, optimistic estimates, but one factor was:
20. For a general discussion of this finding, see CHRISTAKIS, supra note 17, at 66–71 (de-
scribing studies that conclude that physicians tend to substantially overestimate survival); on
doctors and patients, see Donald Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions, 270
JAMA 72, 72–76 (1993) (encouraging physicians to recognize that patients often make irrational
medical decisions and that it is physicians’ role to identify pitfalls in reasoning).
21. CHRISTAKIS, supra note 17, at 66.
22.I d .
23.I d .   (describing C. Murray Parkes, Accuracy of Predictions of Survival in Later Stages of
Cancer, BRIT. MED. J., Vol. 2, 1972, at 29, 29–31 which examined London physicians’ prognoses
for 168 cancer patients, where the prognostic accuracy was defined as no more than twice and
no less than half the actual duration of survival).
24.I d .  at 66–67 (describing Louis H. Heyse-Moore & V.E. Johnson-Bell, Can Doctors Ac-
curately Predict the Life Expectancy of Patients with Terminal Cancer?, 1 PALLIATIVE MED. 165,
165–66 (1987), which found that physicians’ predicted survival rates for terminal cancer patients
averaged eight weeks, compared to an observed average survival rate of two weeks).
25.I d .  at 67, 201–08 (discussing Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, The Extent
and Determinants of Error in Physicians’ Prognoses for Terminally Ill Patients (unpublished
manuscript) and comparing the mortality predictions of physicians for 504 Chicago patients ad-
mitted during 1996 to observed outcomes).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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“the better the doctor knew the patient—as measured, for example,
by the length and intensity of their contact—the more likely the doc-
tor was to err in the prognosis, most frequently by overestimating
survival.”
26 The overall picture is that in cases involving cancer pa-
tients, physicians accurately predict survival only 10–30% of the time,
and the rest of the time they overestimate survival by a factor of two
to five.
27
All of this is highly suggestive but not decisive with respect to the
particular point that we mean to urge here: that experts make errone-
ous judgments about the ordinary standard of medical care, and that
they tend to err in a particular direction. Because expert witnesses in
medical malpractice cases typically are doctors, it would be plausible
to think that their general tendency toward optimism with their pa-
tients would affect their testimony as experts, causing them to over-
state systematically the efficiency and effectiveness of ordinary prac-
tice. At the same time, it also would be possible to imagine that (a)
doctors’ predictions about their patients’ prospects are systematically
overoptimistic, but (b) doctors have an accurate sense of what is ordi-
narily done by themselves and other doctors. If there is no systematic
error with respect to (b), there would be little need to substitute sta-
tistical data for the expert testimony of doctors. We now offer the first
real evidence in the legal literature on the central question, showing
that medical experts systematically err.
28
26.I d .  at 67.
27.I d .  at 68.
28. In a separate phenomenon, physicians are sometimes informally accused of deliberately
offering excessively optimistic or pessimistic prognoses in their clinical practices. Both of these
behaviors are understandable in context. Excessively pessimistic prognoses, commonly referred
to as “hanging crepe,” usually accompany discussions of procedures with particularly problem-
atic outcomes (e.g., surgery for aortic aneurisms, carotid endarterectomies, cardiopulmonary
resuscitation of twenty-three-week-gestation infants). Mark Siegler, Pascal’s Wager and the
Hanging of Crepe, 293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 853, 853–57 (1975). In these cases, the underlying
idea is that the patients should be fully prepared for the statistically expected result (a poor out-
come or even death), and that in the unlikely, but possible, event of a good outcome, both phy-
sician and patient alike will be pleasantly surprised. Id. at 853–54. If patients are prone to opti-
mistic bias, excessively pessimistic prognoses might even be justified as a possible corrective.
There also are well-recognized examples of what appears to be excessive clinical optimism. End-
of-life prognostications are notoriously “optimistic” in that the time to death is commonly over-
estimated. Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and Determinants of Error in
Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients: Prospective Cohort Study, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 469,
472 (2000). This error also is understandable in context—to the extent that there is any element
of “self-fulfilling prophesy” in these situations, physicians may wish their patients to benefit
from this effect.SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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II.  STANDARD OF CARE: EXPERTS VERSUS DATA
A. Bacterial Meningitis
Consider the problem of bacterial meningitis in children.
29 For
the purposes of the current discussion, it is necessary to know only
three things about this disease and its treatment. Bacterial meningitis
is an infection of the brain; it (usually) can be treated with antibiotics;
and, as a general rule, the sooner the antibiotics are administered, the
better the outcome will be.
30
In medical malpractice cases, the question often arises whether
treatment of a particular child was unduly “delayed,”
31 because delay
can cause serious harm.
32 Of course a key issue is how a legal deci-
sionmaker would know what kind of delay counts as “undue.” For
Both of these conditions are simply tangential to the claims made here. We are sug-
gesting that expert descriptions of actual practice, not the discussions that accompany these
practices, are often inaccurate, and predictably so. Practitioners may or may not be well moti-
vated in their attempts to exaggerate outcomes in order to convince their patients of the desir-
ability of a particular course of action ex ante. This may or may not be a good thing to do. But it
is irrelevant to expert testimony. Our purpose here is to minimize the possibility that, when
charged with describing the actual spectrum of clinical care, experts exaggerate their descrip-
tions ex post.
29. Some of the data here is discussed for a nonlegal audience and from a very different
angle in William Meadow et al., Ought “Standard Care” Be the “Standard of Care”? A Study of
the Time to Administration of Antibiotics in Children with Meningitis, 147 AM. J. DISEASES
CHILD. 40, 40–44 (1993) (concluding that “standard of care” is highly subjective and should be
defined by data analysis rather than expert opinion).
30. Acute bacterial meningitis is one of the most life-threatening diseases of childhood and
constitutes a medical emergency. 2 EMERGENCY  MEDICINE: CONCEPTS AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 1213 (Peter Rosen ed., 4th ed. 1998). Death may occur within minutes to hours un-
less rapid diagnoses are made and appropriate antibiotics are administered immediately.
ROSCOE N. GRAY & LOUISE J. GORDY, ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 33.62(1a)
(Lois L. Caswell et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). “Some of the immediate complications of bacterial
meningitis include coma with loss of protective airway reflexes, seizures, cerebral edema, vaso-
motor collapse, disseminated intravascular coagulation, respiratory arrest, dehydration, pericar-
dial effusion, and death.” 3 EMERGENCY MEDICINE, supra, at 2202.
31. See, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss Mem’l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6, 12 (Ill. App. 1986)
(holding that “evidence which shows . . . that negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment . . . less-
ened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish proximate cause” in medical mal-
practice cases).
32. There is a presumed correlation between the duration of symptoms before administra-
tion of antibiotics and the likelihood of subsequent permanent brain damage. The appropriate
time scale (not minutes, perhaps hours, certainly days) to evaluate these time intervals is best
addressed in Michael Radetsky, Duration of Symptoms and Outcome in Bacterial Meningitis, 11
PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 694, 694–98 (1992). See also Meadow et al., supra note 29,
at 43 (discussing how this presumed correlation breaks down when it is considered along the
time scale of minutes).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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obvious reasons, juries are assumed to be ignorant of the general
medical facts in such cases, and consequently are instructed to rely on
the testimony of expert witnesses. The instruction that jurors should
rely on expert opinions for their knowledge about the standard of
medical care answers one question, but it raises another—on what
should the experts themselves rely?
In the traditional formulation, experts are instructed to rely on
their personal “knowledge and training.” For the reasons stated,
however, such admonitions raise many problems. In the context of
bacterial meningitis, for example, it would be reasonable to predict
that experts would tend to be excessively optimistic—that their rec-
ollections of the amount of time that elapsed before antibiotics were
initiated in children with meningitis would be tilted toward shorter
durations than actually occurred. And if this is the case, these experts,
relying on their “knowledge and training,” will provide inaccurate ac-
counts of behavior.
We attempted to test this hypothesis by surveying doctors about
their experiences in cases of childhood meningitis and comparing
these survey responses to detailed descriptions of physicians’ behav-
iors in actual cases of meningitis.
33 We began by identifying doctors
with expertise in the two most relevant subspecialties of pediatrics,
pediatric emergency room medicine (ER) and pediatric infectious
diseases (ID). These are the fields from which potential experts most
likely would be drawn to testify in lawsuits about deviations from the
standard of care in meningitis cases. We presented these doctors with
a questionnaire about a child who was brought to the emergency
room with symptoms suggestive of bacterial meningitis. We asked
how long, in their opinion, it would take to administer antibiotics in
33. Physicians were surveyed using an anonymous, voluntary questionnaire distributed at
the national meeting of the Society for Pediatric Research in 1990. The respondents were identi-
fied only by specialty: general pediatrics, pediatric infectious diseases, pediatric emergency
room medicine, or other. Respondents also indicated their year of graduation from medical
school, the city in which they worked, and the type of hospital in which they worked (children’s
hospital, university hospital, “community” hospital, or other). Twenty-three respondents identi-
fied themselves as pediatric infectious disease specialists and fifty-four identified themselves as
pediatric emergency room specialists. The questionnaire presented the scenario of a child pre-
senting to their emergency room with symptoms consistent with bacterial meningitis. Two re-
lated questions were asked: 1) “What do you think is the median time which elapses between
the presentation of such a patient to the emergency room and the administration of intravenous
antibiotics?”; and 2) “What length of time — from initial presentation to the E.R. until I.V. an-
tibiotic administration — would encompass 95% of all such cases; i.e. of all such patients pre-
senting to the E.R., what time would demarcate the point where 95% of children have received
I.V. antibiotics?” William Meadow, Questionnaire, 1990 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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such cases in their own hospitals. We then compared the responses of
these doctors to the actual time to antibiotic administration
(ABTIME) observed in ninety-three children treated at two large
university-associated pediatric centers in Chicago.
We found, as we had hypothesized, that the recollections of the
potential expert witnesses were wrong. Moreover, they were wrong in
the anticipated direction—that is, biased in favor of the response that,
in retrospect, would be desired (in this case, toward a shorter
ABTIME). The median estimate of the fifty-four ER specialists was
46 minutes; the median estimate of the twenty-three ID specialists
was 80 minutes. By contrast, the median ABTIME of ninety-three ac-
tual cases at the two university centers was 120 minutes, significantly
longer than the estimates of either of the sub-specialty groups.
34 When
we reviewed the medical literature in an attempt to extend these ob-
servations beyond Chicago, we found two hundred reported cases of
children with meningitis from hospitals in South Carolina
35 and Cali-
fornia.
36 These two hundred cases had a median ABTIME (114–126
minutes) comparable to the ninety-three Chicago cases, and longer
than the estimates of either of the two sub-specialties.
37
34. Patient data were compiled from both hospitals independently. ABTIME values were
not normally distributed for either institution. Consequently, the comparison of ABTIME be-
tween hospitals was performed nonparametrically using the Mann-Whitney Rank Sum test. As
no significant difference in ABTIME was noted comparing the two hospitals, data from all
meningitis patients were combined for subsequent analyses. The responses of the ID vs. ER ex-
perts differed significantly from each other (median ER ABTIME = 46 mins; median ID
ABTIME = 80 mins; Zt = 2.28; p = 0.023; ER vs. ID, Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test), and both
were significantly shorter than the actual median value of ABTIME (120 minutes) noted in our
study population (H = 45.33, p < 0.001, Kruskal-Wallis Test; Zt = 2.67, p < 0.008, ABTIME vs.
ID ABTIME, Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test; Zt = 6.60, p < 0.001, ABTIME vs. ER ABTIME,
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test) (aggregate results on file with the Duke Law Journal).
35. Charles S. Bryan et al., Promptness of Antibiotic Therapy in Acute Bacterial Meningitis,
15 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 544, 545 (1986).
36. David A. Talan et al., Analysis of Emergency Department Management of Suspected
Bacterial Meningitis, 18 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 856, 856 (1989).
37. The university hospitals in Chicago are representative of what might be thought of as a
national norm for the best possible treatment situation for a child with meningitis. Necessary
equipment (i.v. catheters, antibiotic solutions) and experienced personnel (triage nurses, emer-
gency physicians) are immediately available for children with meningitis at academic medical
centers. Some have expressed concerns that for many cases this is too high a bar. See Sydney S.
Gellis, “Standard Care” vs. “Standard of Care” in Administration of Antibiotics in Children with
Meningitis, PEDIATRIC NOTES, Feb. 18, 1993, at 25:
Each infant or child presenting to an ER with possible meningitis is an individual
problem and one which cannot be measured against others. . . . Timing will depend on
the numbers of physicians available, numbers of critically ill patients being seen at the
time, the availability of nursing help, [and] the presence of language barriers . . . .SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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Table 1 captures the differences between the opinions of poten-
tial experts and the actual data-based observations:
TABLE 1: VARIATIONS BETWEEN “EXPERT” OPINIONS AND
DATA-BASED OBSERVATIONS FOR ABTIME IN
CHILDREN WITH SUSPECTED BACTERIAL MENINGITIS
ID Experts ER Experts Chicago Hospitals SC and CA Hospitals
80 minutes* 46 minutes** 120 Minutes 114–126 minutes
* p < 0.01
** p < 0.001
Whatever  “expert” opinion means in this context, it does not
mean an accurate opinion. Both groups of potential pediatric experts
were wrong, and substantially so, in their opinions about the amount
of time that elapses before doctors administer antibiotics to children
with meningitis. The statistical probability that the potential experts
were correct was less than one part in 100 for the ID doctors, and less
than one part in 1000 for the ER doctors. As we have emphasized, the
inaccuracy found in the estimates was consistent with our hypothesis:
responses were biased toward the outcome perceived to be desired,
that is, toward shorter waiting periods.
Note that this bias operates independently of the pressures im-
posed by the adversary system, which would naturally lead litigants to
hire experts whose accounts will favor their side. The ID and ER re-
spondents were not asked to consider their responses in the context
of a review for either a plaintiff or defendant in this survey. Moreo-
ver, the optimistic bias presented by the potential experts here is op-
erating outside of the bounds of the usual doctor-patient relationship,
where it has been suggested that optimism, even if inaccurate, may
serve a therapeutic purpose.
38
We think it entirely possible that other circumstances (e.g., smaller hospitals, clinics, or doctors’
offices) may not be comparable to academic medical centers, and that ABTIME in these set-
tings consequently might be longer than at university centers. We would then argue that claims
about care in those smaller centers ought to be met with ABTIME data gathered from these
clinics or offices. Our main point here is that if the standard of care is normative, appropriate
data-based comparisons are best for determining what is normative.
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. There are complex relations between the
malpractice setting and other contexts involving negligence. For example, the question, “How
difficult would it have been for the worker to have avoided this hazard?” might lead to the (op-
timistic) suggestion that it would not have been difficult at all, whereas the question, “How ex-SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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Others, in varying contexts, have demonstrated a similar discon-
nect between physicians’ descriptions of their own practices and ob-
jective determinations of the same behavior. As examples, consider
patient education by physicians in general practice. Physicians are
committed to the value of patient education,
39 and they devote con-
siderable time and resources to health promotion.
40 Clearly, the de-
sired practice is to spend this time explicitly informing patients about
health-related behaviors, such as the uncontested virtues of smoking
cessation and preventive oncology. Nevertheless, when physicians’
reports of their office practices are compared with taped interviews of
these same encounters, there is only a weak, insignificant correlation
between the self-reported patient education activities and the actual
performance.
41 Not surprisingly, physicians’ recollections err in the
predicted direction; that is, more explicit counseling is recalled than
actually occurred.
Here too the cognitive expectation is confirmed—anecdotal re-
call proves to be inaccurate, biased, and, inevitably, systematically
imperfect. If our findings here are the rule and not the exception, as
the psychological evidence suggests, it is hardly clear that the law
should continue to base a system of medical-legal jurisprudence on
such a shaky foundation.
pensive would it have been to have installed a safety device?” might lead to the (optimistic)
suggestion that this would not have been expensive at all. Hence the framing of the question
might lead optimistically biased agents in different directions. In either case, statistics are better
than expert testimony, simply because they are more accurate.
39. Thomas E. Kottke et al., Attributes of Successful Smoking Cessation Interventions in
Medical Practice, 259 JAMA 2883, 2887 (1988) (finding face-to-face advice from physician and
nonphysician counselors to be the best predictor of smoking cessation); Henry Wechsler et al.,
The Physician’s Role in Health Promotion—A Survey of Primary-Care Practitioners, 308 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 97, 98–99 (1983) (finding that nearly three of four physicians feel it is a physician’s
responsibility to educate patients on risk factors including smoking, alcohol, drugs, stress, exer-
cise, and diet, and that eighty-one percent of physicians interviewed personally provide such
education in place of a nurse or other health professional).
40. C. Tracy Orleans et al., Health Promotion in Primary Care: A Survey of U.S. Family
Practitioners, 14 PREVENTIVE MED. 636, 643 (1985) (surveying 610 family practice physicians on
client demographics and medical treatment); see also Ulrich J. Grueninger et al., Patient Educa-
tion in the Medical Encounter: How to Facilitate Learning, Behavior Change, and Coping, in
THE MEDICAL INTERVIEW 122, 122–33 (Mack Lipkin, Jr. ed., 1995) (encouraging physicians not
to simply provide information, but to incorporate educational and behavioral techniques).
41. Orleans et al., supra note 40, at 643; see also James E. Davis et al., Cancer Prevention
and Screening Activities in Primary Care Practice, 16 PREVENTIVE MED. 277, 277 (1987) (com-
paring estimates by Wisconsin physicians of preventive performance with their actual preven-
tive practices).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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B. The Proposal
We acknowledge that the evidence we have offered is suggestive
rather than demonstrative. Perhaps there are contexts in which doc-
tors, or other experts, have an accurate sense of the ordinary standard
of care. But the general evidence of mistakes, together with the em-
pirical evidence introduced here, is sufficient to show that both error
and optimism are highly likely to infect a wide range of expert testi-
mony.
42 This point operates independently of the ordinary incentive
to assist one’s side in an adversary system.
43
It therefore makes sense, in the context of malpractice suits and
probably more generally as well, to move toward greater reliance on
actual data and less reliance on the recollections of isolated experts.
Until recently, the legal system was unable to rely on statistical data
for the simple reason that it did not exist. But it is now increasingly
possible to develop data sets about physician choices and behavior,
and the legal system will have an increasing amount of information on
which to draw. Perhaps government should generate accounts of or-
dinary practice, based on the information that is available; or perhaps
people in the private sector should do so. In either case, the goal
would be to ensure the compilation of actual data about practice, sub-
stituting accurate empirical evidence for the fallible judgments of in-
dividuals.
Our proposal would have two notable advantages. First, it could
simplify the task of discerning the truth. It is now exceedingly difficult
for juries to decide which expert has best described the prevailing
standard of medical care in the community. Under current practice,
this issue may well turn on unreliable judgments about credibility or
on sympathy that is unrelated to the standard of care. Second, and
more important, use of statistical evidence would increase the accu-
racy of assessments of the standard of care, reflecting the comparative
advantage of pooled data over individual recollections. There is no
good reason for courts to continue to rely on the latter when they
have access to the former.
42.S e e  Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 18, at 18–21, 24–27 (discussing individuals’ erro-
neous and overly optimistic decision-framing of probabilities).
43. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role
of Self-Serving Biases, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 355, 355–65 (de-
scribing self-serving bias in judgments about fairness).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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III.  PROBLEMS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Statistical Error?
Our proposal might be criticized on the ground that statistical
analysis is itself subject to error. Of course there can be no assurance
that any particular compilation or interpretation of data is correct.
Perhaps there will be several accounts of data that will compete with
one another. If this is so, it might be objected, the use of statistical
evidence will merely usher in a new phase in the battle between im-
perfect experts. How much would be gained by that?
This objection has a degree of plausibility, but rather than im-
peaching our proposal, it suggests the need to develop good methods
to evaluate particular claims about the meaning of statistical data. In
the event of disagreement, there is no escaping the need to test the
data in the ordinary way through the presentation of conflicting
views, including those of experts. Data might be met with contrary
data; it also might be met with a professional critique. And of course
it is possible that an individual expert will be able to show persua-
sively that some purported evidence does not establish what it claims
to establish. These sorts of disputes can be handled in the standard
fashion. We suggest that because individual experts are prone to sys-
tematic error, it would be far better to begin the process with reliable
evidence rather than with individual recollection. If individual experts
can show that the statistical data are wrong, the legal system will be
better off for the demonstration. In the long run, however, we predict
that these demonstrations will be the exception rather than the rule.
In any case, an inquiry into the evidence will anchor the legal process
in something that is likely to be more reliable.
B. Admissibility: Relevance and Hearsay
Statistical data are not typically used in negligence cases. The
data might be excluded as inadmissible on several grounds. Most im-
portant, questions might be raised about whether the data are rele-
vant and about whether they are hearsay.
It is possible to object that statistical data are not relevant, be-
cause they cannot determine the proper standard of care. In some
states, there is a continuing dispute about the proper role of commonSUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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practice in negligence cases.
44 Where common practice is not determi-
native of the standard of care,
45 statistical data cannot resolve the le-
gal issue. It would be possible to argue that in such circumstances, the
data should be inadmissible on grounds of irrelevance. But this argu-
ment should be rejected. Even when common practice is not determi-
native, it is pertinent, and its relevance is reflected by the very fact
that experts frequently are allowed to testify about what most doctors
do. Statistical data should be found admissible for the same reason
that expert testimony is admissible.
It also might be thought that statistical data should be seen as
hearsay. Perhaps the witness seeking to introduce the data is at-
tempting to repeat what others have said in their reports of the data.
If so, his testimony might be thought to violate the prohibition on
hearsay.
46 But this analysis would misread the hearsay rules. Under
federal law, for example, experts are allowed to rely on “statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a sub-
ject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reli-
able authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by
other expert testimony or by judicial notice.”
47 Federal rules also al-
low experts to base opinions on facts and data of the kind reasonably
used by experts in the field when they form opinions or inferences.
48
Statistical data, if published, should be permitted under the first rule
just quoted; if unpublished, they should be admissible to the extent
that they are of the sort reasonably relied on by experts. Under either
scenario, however, data should not be treated as inadmissible hearsay.
44. See supra note 1; infra note 46.
45. See, e.g., Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1027–28 (Ill. 1996) (find-
ing that evidence of compliance by the defendant blood bank with the professional standard of
care imposed under a blood shield statute was not conclusive proof of “due care”); Roach v.
Springfield Clinic, No. 73,394, 1992 Ill. LEXIS 204, at *33–*36 (Ill. Dec. 4, 1992) (finding that
the exclusion of evidence describing medical standards of care did not prejudice a malpractice
trial outcome); Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill. 1965) (find-
ing that the hospital’s standard practice and conformity to regulations did not constitute conclu-
sive evidence of reasonable care).
46.S e e  People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485, 487–90 (Ill. 1986) (permitting a psychiatric
expert to disclose the facts and opinions from others’ evaluations on which he relied in diagno-
sis); Schrag v. Chi. City Ry. Co., 106 N.E. 828, 829–30 (Ill. 1914) (prohibiting the admission of
scientific books into evidence, as well as their use to contradict an expert witness not relying
upon them).
47. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
48. FED. R. EVID. 703, 705. But see Roach, 1992 Ill. LEXIS, at *32–*33 (refusing to allow
references to treatises on the ground that their authors are not available for cross-examination).
The Roach decision seems to us an anachronistic and odd reading of the prohibition on hearsay.SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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C. Textbooks and Treatises
Perhaps there are other solutions, besides reliance on statistical
data, to the problem of idiosyncratic recollections of individual ex-
perts. It might be urged that the opinions of experts, as reported in
textbooks or journal publications, should define the standard of care.
By this view, when actual practices differ from the theoretical or rec-
ommended standards, the practitioners are at fault. They may not
know the standard, may disagree with it, or may have misinterpreted
it, but the burden of proof falls on them.
We believe that this approach would be oversimplified and mis-
guided. Under the law, ordinary practice is important for its own
sake, regardless of whether it is decisive of the legally acceptable
standard of care. If courts are going to consider the ordinary practice,
they should have an accurate understanding of what it is; here, text-
book and treatise authors, like all other experts, are prone to error.
Unless a textbook or treatise actually draws its conclusions from or-
dinary practice, it will not report the ordinary practice reliably.
Perhaps textbooks and journals merely state recommendations
that are worth consideration even if they do not capture ordinary
practice. This is not implausible. But interpreting these recommended
standards is not always straightforward. In the particular context of
bacterial meningitis, textbooks recommend that antibiotics should be
administered “early,”
49  “promptly,”
50 or “immediately”
51 to children
with suspected meningitis. But what, in the minds of a lay jury, is a
reasonable interpretation of this recommendation? In such a context,
is thirty minutes too long? Is one hour, or six hours? The recommen-
dation in one text that antibiotics be administered “within 30 minutes
after the diagnosis of meningitis is established”
52 helps a good deal,
but it does not resolve the question, as it merely presents another
troubling question—when exactly is the “diagnosis of meningitis es-
tablished?”
But there is a more general point. At most, the author of a text-
book can offer an opinion about the standard practice or about the
49. ABRAHAM M. RUDOLPH, PEDIATRICS 422 (16th ed. 1977).
50. 1 RALPH  D. FEIGIN & JAMES D. CHERRY, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRIC  INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 302 (1981).
51. RICHARD  E. BEHRMAN  & VICTOR  C. VAUGHAN, TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 571
(Waldo E. Nelson ed., 13th ed. 1987).
52. GERALD L. MANDELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES
738 (1979).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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practice that is desirable. If the opinion involves what is desirable, it
should be evaluated as such. But if the opinion involves what is stan-
dard, the question should be whether the opinion is correct. To the
extent that the question inquires into ordinary practice—into what
doctors do—it would be far better to rely on actual data about physi-
cian performance.
Our plea here has been for attention to data, rather than to
opinions. Ultimately we might hope for authoritative texts on what is
established by the data, and such texts might come from the govern-
ment or from the private sector. To the extent that there is competi-
tion among sources of data, all the better. And to the extent that data
about actual practice are available, the data should inform, and im-
prove, the debate about the extent to which the legal system should
be bound by the ordinary standard of care when determining the ap-
propriate standard of care.
53
CONCLUSION
It is well known that ordinary people make systematic errors in
assessing probabilities and risks.
54 It is less well known that experts
are subject to the same biases and likely to make the same mistakes.
55
We have suggested here that there is general reason to believe that
expert judgments about the standard of medical care will be errone-
ous, and that the errors will run in a predictable direction because of
optimistic bias. People tend to believe that things can be done, and
are in fact done, more easily, more rapidly, and more successfully
than the evidence suggests. To establish this claim, we have drawn on
existing evidence, highly suggestive on this point, and on more par-
ticular evidence, presented here, that experts do not accurately report
the ordinary standard of care.
Our principal innovation has been to suggest that in light of the
evident divergence between expert beliefs and empirical reality, the
legal system should rely, whenever possible, not on the former but on
53.S e e  supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of customary practice
in negligence judgments).
54. W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 5 (1998); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahne-
man,  Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,  in J UDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 38 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 107 (2001).
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the inaccuracy of expert judgment
that results from error and optimism).SUNSTEIN.DOC 01/16/02  9:25 AM
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statistical evidence of the latter. The best reason for the legal system’s
longstanding reliance on individual recollections has been historical—
the simple absence of statistical evidence. But the current practice is
an anachronism. The reason is that this gap in statistical evidence is
rapidly being filled with a great deal of reliable data, and it may be
completely filled in the next generation. Our emphasis has been on
the question of medical malpractice, but the general implication is far
broader. In any case in which a disputed question calls for expert tes-
timony about ordinary practice, it is hazardous to rely on what par-
ticular experts recall. If the goal is accuracy in adjudication or regula-
tion, it is far more sensible to make the outcome turn on statistical
evidence.